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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The state secrets privilege has received a tremendous amount 
of scholarly attention in the United States in the last decade.  The 
focus started early in President Bush’s second term with the 
emergence of a pattern of the administration seeking dismissals of 
lawsuits during the pleadings stage, even when the suits dealt with 
allegations of gross human rights violations and last resort attempts 
of gravely injured individuals to vindicate their rights.1 
 
       †    Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law.  J.D. 
Columbia Law School, A.B. Stanford University.  I owe thanks to Matthew H. 
Charity and Adam Tomkins for reviewing earlier drafts and discussing the ideas in 
this Essay with me, to law librarian Renee Rastorfer for her valuable research 
assistance, and to the board of the William Mitchell Law Review for inviting me to 
write this Essay.  I also thank participants at the Conference on Secrecy, National 
Security, and the Vindication of Constitutional Law, hosted by the International 
Association of Constitutional Law Research Group on Constitutional Responses to 
Terrorism in December 2011, and participants at my February 2012 talk at the 
Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, whose questions 
and suggestions helped strengthen this Essay.  Portions of the analysis in this Essay 
are drawn from a previous work: Sudha Setty, Litigating Secrets: Comparative 
Perspectives on the State Secrets Privilege, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 201 (2009). 
 1. Press Release, Office of U.S. Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Kennedy 
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Congress has, in the last few years, toyed with the idea of 
attempting to rein in the executive’s increasing reliance on the 
state secrets privilege as a means of escaping the possibility of 
accountability: It debated the State Secrets Protection Act of 2008 
in response to Bush Administration invocations of the privilege in 
high-profile cases in which plaintiffs alleged extraordinary 
rendition, torture, and prolonged detention by the U.S. 
government and its allies.2  Although this proposed legislation 
lapsed after the election of President Barack Obama, Congress 
reintroduced nearly identical reform legislation in February 20093 
after the Obama Administration appeared to adopt the Bush 
Administration’s stance in favor of a broad and sweeping 
invocation and application of the privilege.4  The proposed 
legislation again lost momentum after the Obama Administration 
released a new policy for the Department of Justice in September 
2009 that mandated a more rigorous internal administrative review 
prior to invoking the state secrets privilege.5 
 
Introduces State Secrets Protection Act (Jan. 22, 2008) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), available at 2008 WLNR 1256008; e.g., Amanda Frost, The State Secrets 
Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1939 (2007) (“The 
Bush Administration has raised the privilege in twenty-eight percent more cases 
per year than in the previous decade, and has sought dismissal in ninety-two 
percent more cases per year than in the previous decade.”); William G. Weaver & 
Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 100 (2005) 
(claiming that the Bush Administration is using the state secrets privilege with 
“offhanded abandon”); see also William G. Weaver & Danielle Escontrias, Origins of 
the State Secrets Privilege, SELECTED WORKS OF WILLIAM G. WEAVER 3–4 (Feb. 10, 
2008), http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context 
=william_weaver (describing the state secrets privilege and how important of a tool 
it is for the executive branch); cf. Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of 
National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1252 (2007) (claiming that 
a survey of the invocation of the state secrets privilege in the post-Reynolds era 
indicates that “recent assertions of the privilege are not different in kind from the 
practice of other administrations”). 
 2. 154 CONG. REC. S198-201 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2008) (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy on the State Secrets Protection Act). 
 3. See Press Release, Office of U.S. Sen. Patrick Leahy, Leahy, Specter, 
Feingold, Kennedy Introduce State Secrets Legislation (Feb. 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=81a196e2-692e-
498d-bf80-96ba81e252b5. 
 4. Editorial, Continuity of the Wrong Kind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009, at A30 
(disagreeing with the Obama Administration’s decision to continue the Bush 
Administration invocations of the state secrets privilege to try to have litigation 
against the government dismissed at the pleadings stage). 
 5. See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., on Policies and 
Procedures Governing Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege to Heads of Exec. 
Dep’ts & Agencies (Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Holder Memorandum], available 
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However, in the two years since the new policy took effect, it 
appears as though this internal review process has resulted in little 
difference between the Bush and Obama Administrations with 
regard to the invocation of the privilege at the pleadings stage in 
cases that allege serious constitutional violations and human rights 
abuses.6 
One high-profile case, that of Binyam Mohamed and other 
plaintiffs claiming that they had been subject to extraordinary 
rendition, torture, and prolonged detention, illustrates three 
important dynamics: continuity in approach between the Bush and 
Obama Administrations; the deferential attitude of the reviewing 
court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which, although 
appalled by allegations of government abuse, used a rigid, 
formalistic analysis that denied Mohamed the right to proceed with 
his case; and the distancing in the approach of U.S. courts from 
those in England that were confronted with the same plaintiff and 
set of facts.7 
The use of judicial formalism8 in Mohamed illustrates the 
judiciary’s internal struggle to determine its appropriate role when 
 
at http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/ag-memo-re-state-secrets-dated-09-22-09 
.pdf (establishing layers of internal review within the Department of Justice and 
including a new executive branch policy to report to Congress any invocations of 
the state secrets privilege). 
 6. See Sudha Setty, Litigating Secrets: Comparative Perspectives on the State Secrets 
Privilege, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 201, 257–58 (2009) (identifying the continuity between 
the Bush and Obama Administrations in their approach to the state secrets 
privilege).  
 7. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1130 (N.D. 
Cal. 2008). 
 8. Judicial formalism can be conceived in numerous ways, but I use it here 
to refer to a judicial methodology that gives primacy to narrow rule-following 
rather than consideration of the role of the courts to act in a way that is infused 
with morality when necessary to preserve individual rights.  See Richard H. Pildes, 
Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 612–16 (1999) (describing one form of 
formalism as “apurposive rule-following”).  Other commentators have described 
the constraints of judicial formalism as “a commitment to, and therefore also a 
belief in the possibility of, a method of legal justification that can be clearly 
contrasted to open-ended disputes about the basic terms of social life, disputes 
that people call ideological, philosophical, or visionary.”  Roberto M. Unger, The 
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 564 (1983).  On the other 
hand, Justice Antonin Scalia has supported the use of a formal approach to 
maximize stability and credibility in the Supreme Court’s decision-making, 
opining that a “discretion-conferring approach is ill suited . . . to a legal system in 
which the supreme court can review only an insignificant proportion of the 
decided cases.”  See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1175, 1178 (1989). 
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confronted with constitutional rights questions during a time of 
war or perceived emergency9—a dilemma that has been confronted 
by courts in constitutional democracies around the world.10  The 
Mohamed litigation offers evidence of a disturbing trend of U.S. 
courts retreating to formalistic reasoning to extend unwarranted 
deference to the executive branch in security-related contexts.11  In 
this Essay, I limit my analysis to the recent jurisprudence 
surrounding the state secrets privilege.  I place the formalist 
decision-making of the Mohamed court in juxtaposition with other 
nations’ jurisprudence—including the English courts that dealt 
 
 9. In Minimalism at War, Cass Sunstein analyzes three categories of judicial 
decision-making in wartime: national security maximalism, in which courts defer 
broadly to executive branch claims of Article II authority without weighing the cost 
in terms of constitutional liberty interests; liberty maximalism, in which courts 
maintain a peacetime approach to the protection of constitutional liberty 
interests; and minimalism, in which courts use constitutional avoidance theory, 
statutory authority, and a narrow approach to creating precedent to weigh security 
and liberty interests.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 
47, 50–52 (2004).  Sunstein views national security maximalism as inadequately 
accounting for fundamental liberty principles and liberty maximalism as 
unrealistic and unwarranted given the need for greater government intrusion into 
liberties during wartime, concluding that minimalism is the most appropriate 
judicial approach during wartime.  Id.  I suggest that Mohamed and similar 
decisions should be conceived of differently, reflecting a formal and narrow 
adherence to procedures and rules as a means of enabling deference to executive 
secrecy claims and avoiding real engagement in the civil liberties dilemma 
underlying the case. 
 10. See generally Aharon Barak, The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, and 
the Fight Against Terrorism, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 125, 125–26 (2003) (discussing the 
obligation of the Israeli judiciary to remain vigilant against incursions on the rule 
of law); Aileen Kavanagh, Constitutionalism, Counterterrorism and the Courts: Changes 
in the British Constitutional Landscape, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 172, 173–74 (2011) 
(discussing the extent to which U.K. courts have engaged in constitutionalism as 
part of their decision-making after the passage of the Human Rights Act of 1998); 
Mrinal Satish & Aparna Chandra, Of Maternal State and Minimalist Judiciary: The 
Indian Supreme Court’s Approach to Terror-Related Adjudication, 21 NAT’L L. SCH. INDIA 
REV. 51, 59–67 (2009) (arguing that the Indian Supreme Court has been 
inconsistent in its approach to terrorism-related cases and other cases involving 
fundamental rights). 
 11. The type of national security judicial formalism I describe is evident in a 
number of recent cases.  E.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(dismissing suit seeking damages for extraordinary rendition and torture upon a 
finding that constitutional and international law obligations did not apply); Al-
Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing suit seeking 
injunctive relief for the listing of plaintiff’s son on the U.S. targeted killings list 
based on standing and political question grounds); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 
2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing suit seeking 
damages for extraordinary rendition and torture upon upholding the 
government’s invocation of the state secrets privilege). 
  
2012] JUDICIAL FORMALISM 1633 
with a separate lawsuit brought by Mohamed there.  In this type of 
case, the United States appears to be moving away from the 
flexible, rule-of-law-oriented approach that courts in the United 
Kingdom and Israel take.  Instead, U.S. courts are echoing the 
formalistic rigidity that the Indian Supreme Court uses in cases 
involving state invocations of secrecy. 
Given the Obama Administration’s continuing aggressive 
invocation of the state secrets privilege and the judiciary’s seeming 
unwillingness to step into its countermajoritarian role to defend 
the ability of individuals to litigate their basic human and civil 
rights, I conclude that Congress should re-introduce state secrets 
reform legislation that could infuse the litigation process with some 
level of procedural and substantive fairness.  At the same time, I 
urge courts to step away from the type of judicial formalism that 
they have rejected to some extent in other national security 
contexts, such as habeas corpus rights for detainees.12  U.S. courts 
would do well to heed the lessons of countries like India, the 
United Kingdom, and Israel in terms of understanding the 
ramifications of a judiciary unwilling to engage in decision-making 
on these issues. 
II. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S INVOCATION OF THE STATE 
SECRETS PRIVILEGE 
In his prefatory language to the Obama Administration’s 2009 
state secrets policy, Attorney General Holder emphasizes that the 
policy’s goals include  
provid[ing] greater accountability and reliability in the 
invocation of the state secrets privilege in litigation . . . 
[and] strengthen[ing] public confidence that the U.S. 
government will invoke the privilege in court only when 
genuine and significant harm to national defense or 
foreign relations is at stake and only to the extent 
necessary to safeguard those interests.13   
The policy further includes important limitations on the 
Department of Justice’s use of the privilege, including a 
 
 12. Decisions like Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507 (2004), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), and Boumediene v. Bush, 
553 U.S. 723 (2008) reflect the Supreme Court’s willingness to engage in a level of 
rights-protective reasoning that preserves the rule of law in the context of habeas 
corpus rights. 
 13. Holder Memorandum, supra note 5, at 1. 
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prohibition against using the privilege to: 
(i) [C]onceal violations of the law, inefficiency, or 
administrative error; (ii) prevent embarrassment to a 
person, organization, or agency of the United States 
government; (iii) restrain competition; or (iv) prevent or 
delay the release of information the release of which 
would not reasonably be expected to cause significant 
harm to national security.14 
The rest of the policy establishes the layers of review within the 
Department of Justice with regard to satisfying the procedural 
requirements for invoking and defending the privilege.15 
To many observers, this policy signaled the possibility of an 
important change from the perceived overuse and abuse of the 
privilege under the Bush Administration.16  However, the Obama 
Administration’s invocation of the privilege has been as aggressive 
as that of President Bush, as the case of Binyam Mohamed 
exemplifies.  
In Mohamed, the Northern District of California dismissed a 
suit brought by five detainees against a Boeing subsidiary allegedly 
involved in the transportation of the detainees for government-
directed rendition and torture.17  The allegations of Binyam 
Mohamed, a British resident, are similar to those of others 
subjected to extraordinary rendition.  Mohamed traveled to 
Afghanistan in 2001 to, according to his account, escape a lifestyle 
that led to drug addiction in England.18  According to U.S. 
authorities, Mohamed trained with the Taliban in Afghanistan to 
prepare for an attack within the United States.  Mohamed was 
 
 14. Holder Memorandum, supra note 5, at 2. 
 15. These procedural requirements are laid out in the first U.S. case to deal 
specifically with the state secrets privilege.  United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 
6–8, 10–11 (1953).  For an in-depth account of the Reynolds case, see LOUIS FISHER, 
IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE 
REYNOLDS CASE (2006). 
 16. Some commentators expressed skepticism of the 2009 policy even at the 
time it was issued.  See Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. to Limit Use of State Secrets 
Privilege, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2009, at A16 (“Congress must still enact legislation 
that provides consistent standards and procedures for courts to use when 
considering state secrets claims.  Our constitutional system requires meaningful, 
independent judicial review of governmental secrecy claims.” (quoting Rep. 
Jerrold Nadler) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 17. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1130 (N.D. 
Cal. 2008). 
 18. Profile: Binyam Mohamed, BBC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2009, 16:00 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7870387.stm. 
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arrested in Pakistan in 2002 as he attempted to return to the 
United Kingdom; he claims that he was detained and tortured in 
Pakistan, then transported to Morocco where he was held 
incommunicado and tortured for the next eighteen months.19  
Mohamed alleges that he was then moved to Afghanistan and was 
ultimately transferred to the U.S. detention center at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba, where he was held from September 2004 until February 
2009.20  Mohamed and others alleging they were subjected to 
extraordinary rendition by the United States filed suit in 2007 
against Jeppesen Dataplan, the Boeing subsidiary that operated the 
airplanes that transported the detainees to various detention 
centers around the world.21 
In granting the government’s motion to dismiss, the district 
court cited much of the same reasoning that other U.S. courts 
dealing with the privilege had relied upon,22 including the need to 
dismiss the suit because the subject matter at issue—the 
government’s extraordinary rendition program—was itself a state 
secret that, if revealed, could jeopardize national security 
interests.23  The plaintiffs appealed this decision while the Bush 
Administration was still in power.  Oral argument on the appeal 
was scheduled for shortly after the Obama Administration took 
over, and many expected that the new administration would not 
contest the appeal or would do so on limited grounds.  Instead, the 
Obama Administration followed with the litigation strategy begun 
by the Bush Administration—one that sought affirmation of the 
dismissal of Mohamed’s case.24  A Ninth Circuit panel reversed, 
adhering closely to the narrow standard first articulated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in United States v. Reynolds in 1953 and rejecting the 
government’s claims that the suit needed to be dismissed outright 
 
 19. Id.  Mohamed alleges that he was beaten, scalded, and suffered cuts on 
his genitals with a scalpel by his captors.  Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Amended Complaint at 1–6, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 
F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07–2798). 
 22. E.g., El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d, 479 
F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing based on the state secrets privilege a suit in 
which plaintiff alleged extraordinary rendition and torture). 
 23. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1134–36 
(N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 24. At that point, representatives of the Obama Administration reiterated the 
Bush Administration argument that the suit was properly dismissed based on the 
invocation of the state secrets privilege.  See John Schwartz, Obama Backs Off a 
Reversal on Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at A12. 
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based on its subject matter.25 
Although this decision offered an opportunity for President 
Obama to align his administration’s position with his campaign 
promises to reform the use of the state secrets privilege,26 the 
administration appealed to the Ninth Circuit to hear the case en 
banc, where it prevailed in having Mohamed’s suit dismissed. 
III. UNPACKING THE FORMALISM IN MOHAMED 
In September 2010, the Ninth Circuit dismissed en banc the 
plaintiffs’ suit in a formalistic opinion that failed to acknowledge 
the reality of the gross human rights abuses that the plaintiffs 
suffered at the hands of the U.S. government.  The court dismissed 
the plaintiffs’ suit while expressing concern about the lack of 
remedy available to the plaintiffs;27 the majority opinion went so far 
as to suggest the remote possibility of compensation from the 
Obama Administration or a congressionally fashioned remedy to 
compensate for the grievous harm suffered by the plaintiffs.28  The 
dissent, on the other hand, used a rule of law analysis to critique 
the majority, emphasizing the role of the court in providing a 
venue for those subjected to government abuse to seek redress and 
emphasizing the judiciary’s responsibility to facilitate government 
accountability.29 
The majority’s reasoning begins with an obligatory recitation 
of the standard set forth for evaluating an invocation of the state 
secrets privilege: ascertaining whether the procedural requirements 
of invocation have been met; determining whether the information 
is privileged; and, assuming the privilege claim is successful, 
determining how to resolve the matter.30  The court dispenses 
 
 25. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 997, 1009 (9th Cir. 
2009).  The Ninth Circuit further clarified that documents considered “classified” 
for Freedom of Information Act purposes are not necessarily “secret” for purposes 
of the state secrets privilege and that the government had the burden of 
establishing the need for genuine secrecy.  Id. at 1006–08. 
 26. Editorial, Too Many ‘State Secrets Privilege’ Cases, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/14/opinion/la-ed-secrets14-2009dec14 
(noting that Obama’s defense of the Bush Administration position in Mohamed was 
in contrast to his campaign promises regarding the state secrets privilege). 
 27. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc). 
 28. Id. at 1091–92. 
 29. Id. at 1101 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 
 30. Id. at 1080 (majority opinion) (relying on the test articulated in United 
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1953)). 
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relatively quickly with the first two questions, finding that the 
procedural requirements have been met and holding that the 
information is privileged based on government affidavits and the 
court’s examination of some of the classified evidence.31 
The majority then dwells on the question of how to resolve the 
matter.  The court begins with its understanding of its obligation to 
dismiss a suit if it appears that privileged information will be 
necessary to litigate the case.32  The majority finds that even if 
plaintiffs are able to prove their case relying solely on publicly 
available evidence, dismissal of the suit is still necessary because of 
the difficulty that Jeppesen Dataplan would have in defending itself 
against the suit without implicating privileged material.33  It is 
particularly ironic that the majority opinion, while claiming to have 
struggled with the tension between human rights and security 
concerns, ultimately retreats to rigid and formalist reasoning that 
turns on its concern that a company that was allegedly complicit in 
the torture of innocent civilians is able to adequately defend itself 
in a civil matter.34 
Instead of asserting the role of the courts as a venue in which 
those alleging human rights violations have the opportunity of 
access to justice, the majority opinion abdicates its responsibility as 
a standard bearer for the rule of law and a bulwark against 
government abuses.  Instead, it offers several platitudes as to its 
own actions and the possibility of government accountability and 
redress stemming from the other branches of government: first, 
that the administration has complied with its own 2009 policy with 
regard to intra-executive review of claims of the state secrets 
privilege;35 second, that the executive branch may decide someday 
to compensate the victims of the extraordinary rendition program, 
as was done decades after the rendition and internment of 
individuals of Japanese descent during World War II;36 third, that 
 
 31. Id. at 1085–86. 
 32. Id. at 1083. 
 33. Id. at 1089–90. 
 34. The veracity of the plaintiffs’ claims about Jeppesen Dataplan’s complicity 
in the torture is not factored into the majority opinion, a point raised by the 
dissent.  See id. at 1095 n.5 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (noting that former Jeppesen 
Dataplan employees understood that their extraordinary rendition flights resulted 
in the torture of detainees, but that the company continued to run the flights 
because they “paid very well”). 
 35. Id. at 1090. 
 36. Id. at 1091.  It is remarkable that the majority stretched its reasoning to 
consider the reparations awarded to Japanese internees during World War II as a 
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Congress could initiate an investigation into government abuses; 
fourth, that Congress could enact private bills to compensate the 
plaintiffs; and fifth, that Congress could take up state secrets 
reform.37  These potential avenues for compensation seem unlikely 
at best, and noting the executive branch’s adherence to its own 
procedures or the possibility of future state secrets reform offers 
only cold comfort to plaintiffs. 
The dissent by Judge Hawkins focuses largely on procedural 
matters, but also offers a critique of the narrowness of the majority 
opinion.  In a section dealing with the appropriate standard of 
review of a Rule 12 dismissal, Judge Hawkins notes the veracity of 
Mohamed’s claims of Jeppesen Dataplan’s role in rendition and 
torture and remarks that the majority’s failure to give weight to 
these claims undermines an appropriate Rule 12 analysis.38  The 
dissent’s conclusion offers a direct rule-of-law-oriented critique: 
first, Judge Hawkins observes that the majority has “disregard[ed] 
the concept of checks and balances” and abdicated its responsibility 
by suggesting that the executive or Congress should act to provide 
compensation; second, the dissent characterizes the majority’s 
suggestion regarding reparations as “elevat[ing] the impractical to 
the point of absurdity”; and finally, the dissent notes the horror of 
what was suffered by the plaintiffs and the need to preserve an 
avenue for them to seek redress in the courts if possible.39 
The en banc decision in Mohamed, with its abdication of the 
court’s traditional rule of law responsibilities, makes clear that 
Congress should step in and clarify the state secrets privilege.40  The 
 
potentially appropriate model of compensation for extraordinary rendition and 
torture.  First, those reparations came decades after the harm to the internees and 
only after a national soul-searching was undertaken as to how such poor national 
security policy was validated by all branches of government and the public.  
Second, hearkening back to the World War II internment can only evoke 
comparisons to the deferential formalism of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944), which most modern commentators view as a profound failure of the 
judiciary to apply a rule of law analysis to a case balancing security interests with 
human rights. 
 37. Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1091–92. 
 38. Id. at 1095–96. 
 39. Id. at 1101. 
 40. It is clearly not in the interest of the executive branch to initiate any 
tinkering with the state secrets privilege, since the current application tends to 
grant most government requests for dismissal or non-discovery.  See Editorial, 
Secrets and Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/02 
/opinion/02sat1.html?ref=editorials (noting that the proposed congressional 
measures were necessary given the courts’ reflexive dismissal of cases involving 
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current application of the state secrets privilege raises numerous 
questions that require clarification: when the government can 
invoke the privilege and what can be protected from disclosure; 
whether it is appropriate to grant a motion to dismiss based on a 
state secrets claim at the initial pleadings stage; what the 
appropriate relief for a valid claim of the privilege is; and how 
deeply the court must examine the government’s claim.  Congress’s 
refusal to enact reform thus far, in combination with the judiciary’s 
inaction, has led to a de facto ceding of almost all decision-making 
control on this issue to the executive branch.41 
IV. FORMALISM IN THE COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 
The Reynolds Court, in establishing the standard for evaluating 
a claim of privilege, drew from English precedent from the World 
War II era.  The English version of the state secrets privilege, 
known as public interest immunity, has evolved in a different 
direction than that of the United States since that time; this 
dynamic is illustrated most dramatically in the English judiciary’s 
contemporaneous treatment of Binyam Mohamed’s lawsuit in the 
English courts. 
To further contextualize the analysis of judicial formalism in 
the application of the privilege, I also look at how Israel and 
India—countries facing significant national security challenges that 
rely heavily on U.K. precedent—deal with questions of state secrets 
and the role of the courts during litigation.42 
A. England 
English courts generally afford high levels of deference to 
government officials claiming public interest immunity,43 although 
the 2009 and 2010 decisions in the case of Binyam Mohamed 
 
national security issues). 
 41. See Aziz Rana, Who Decides on Security? 4, 35 (Cornell Law Sch., Faculty 
Working Paper No. 87, 2011), available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi 
/viewcontent.cgi?article=1090&context=clsops_papers. 
 42. India and Israel are useful comparators as functioning democracies with 
constitutionally mandated separation of powers and serious ongoing national 
security threats, and, like the United States in the context of the state secrets 
privilege, both countries derive some legal processes from the United Kingdom. 
 43. See Air Canada v. Sec’y of State for Trade, [1983] 2 A.C. 394 at 395 (Eng.) 
(stating that when a government official has proffered a good faith affidavit as to 
the need for the public interest immunity to apply, the court should give absolute 
deference). 
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illustrate a potential shift in this trend.  The Divisional Court in 
that case forewent its previously typical deference and engaged in 
the complexities of the case in a way that took into account the 
larger objectives and role of the judiciary and the need to maintain 
an avenue for government accountability for alleged human rights 
abuses. 
The backdrop of the English litigation in Mohamed ties back to 
proceedings in the United States.  In May 2008, the United States 
charged Mohamed under the Military Commissions Act44 with 
conspiracy to commit terrorism,45 relying on confessions that 
Mohamed alleged were elicited under the threat of torture.46  
Mohamed began proceedings in English courts, seeking release of 
evidence in the possession of the British government that the 
United States had compiled against Mohamed.  In August 2008, a 
court ruled in Mohamed’s favor, concluding that Mohamed’s 
allegations of torture were substantiated and that he had a right to 
evidence that supported his claim.47  As part of its ruling, the court 
summarized evidence gleaned from U.S. intelligence sources, but 
redacted that summary after the Foreign Secretary issued a public 
interest immunity certificate claiming that state secrets were at issue 
in Mohamed’s suit.48 
The Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division 
reconsidered in early 2009 whether the public interest immunity 
certificate issued by the Foreign Secretary was compelling such that 
the previously redacted summary with evidence of Mohamed’s 
treatment could not be given to Mohamed’s attorneys.49  The 
public interest immunity certificate asserted that the summary 
report must remain undisclosed because the U.S government had 
 
 44. 10 U.S.C. §§ 948–50 (2006). 
 45. This proceeding was later dropped, as the convening judge determined 
the prosecution could not proceed without the use of evidence obtained through 
torture.  See William Glaberson, U.S. Drops Charges for 5 Guantánamo Detainees, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/washington/22gitmo 
.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1328130327-WTFkFvw3ue0Rn9QlvAuLHQ. 
 46. Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2008] 
EWHC (Admin) 2048, [38]–[47] (Eng.). 
 47. Id. at [105]. 
 48. Id. at [150]–[160]. 
 49. The court noted that the information in question was “seven very short 
paragraphs amounting to about 25 lines” of text which summarized reports by the 
U.S. government to British intelligence services on the treatment of Mohamed 
during his detention in Pakistan.  See Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign & 
Commonwealth Affairs, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [14] (Eng.). 
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threatened to “re-evaluate its intelligence sharing relationship with 
the United Kingdom” and possibly withhold vital national security 
information from the United Kingdom should the summary be 
disclosed to Mohamed’s attorneys.50  
The English court laid out the test for balancing the public 
interest in national security and the public interest in “open justice, 
the rule of law and democratic accountability.”51  The test involved 
balancing the public interest in disclosure of the information and 
the possibility of serious harm to a public interest, such as national 
security, if disclosure is made, and determining whether national 
security interests can be protected by means other than 
nondisclosure.52  In theory, its analysis is not unlike that of the 
Ninth Circuit en banc majority in Mohamed.  The application of this 
analysis, however, and the recognition of the importance of the 
detrimental effects of upholding the privilege differ significantly. 
The English court took pains to detail all of the reasons that 
disclosure was desirable, including upholding the rule of law,53 
comporting with international and supranational standards,54 
ensuring that allegations of serious criminality are not dismissed 
inappropriately,55 maintaining accountability over the executive 
branch of government,56 and protecting the public and media 
interest in disclosure of government activities.57  The court also 
appeared surprised that the U.S. government was apparently 
interfering in a matter of government accountability in another 
country, taking pains to note: 
[I]n light of the long history of the common law and 
democracy which we share with the United States, it was, 
in our view difficult to conceive that a democratically 
 
 50. Id. at [62]; see Glenn Greenwald, Obama Administration Threatens Britain to 
Keep Torture Evidence Concealed, SALON.COM (May 12, 2009, 9:36 AM), 
http://www.salon.com/2009/05/12/obama_101. 
 51. Mohamed, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [18] (Eng.) (noting that this case 
revolved around a question of the rule of law, not around the rights of an 
individual litigant). 
 52. Id. at [34] (citing Regina v. H, [2004] 2 A.C. 134 (H.L.) [36(3)] (Eng.)). 
 53. Mohamed, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [18]–[19] (Eng.). 
 54. See id. at [20]–[21], [26], [30], [101]–[105]. 
 55. Id. at [26(iv)], [26(ix)]. 
 56. Id. at [32]. 
 57. Id. at [37] (“Where there is no publicity there is no justice. . . . There is 
no greater danger of usurpation than that which proceeds little by little, under 
cover of rules of procedure, and at the instance of judges themselves.” (quoting 
Scott v. Scott, [1913] A.C. 417 (H.L.) 477 (Lord Shaw of Dunfermline) (appeal 
taken from EWCA (Civ)) (U.K.)). 
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elected and accountable government could possibly have 
any rational objection to placing into the public domain 
such a summary of what its own officials reported as to 
how a detainee was treated by them and which made no 
disclosure of sensitive intelligence matters.  Indeed we did 
not consider that a democracy governed by the rule of law 
would expect a court in another democracy to suppress a 
summary of the evidence . . . where the evidence was 
relevant to allegations of torture and cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, politically embarrassing though it 
might be.58 
Despite the strong language regarding the rule of law and 
government transparency, when the court applied the test, it relied 
heavily on its long-standing precedent of offering deference to the 
executive branch in matters of national security,59 found that the 
Foreign Secretary acted in good faith in issuing the public interest 
immunity certificate,60 opined that an opportunity for government 
accountability may still exist with ongoing investigations within the 
United Kingdom into Mohamed’s allegations,61 and decided that 
there was no basis on which it could question the Foreign 
Secretary’s issuance of the public interest immunity certificate.62 
At this point, the analysis of the Ninth Circuit en banc decision 
and the Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench appear at least 
superficially consistent.  Although the Divisional Court undertakes 
a more rigorous balancing test, both courts act with extreme 
deference and ultimately dismiss plaintiffs’ claims despite concerns 
regarding the rule of law, human rights, and accountability. 
However, the English court reconsidered its own decision 
 
 58. Id. at [69]. 
 59. See id. at [63]–[67].  However, the court noted that such deference 
needed to be limited to instances of genuine national security, and not cases in 
which “it appears that while disclosure of the material may cause embarrassment 
or arouse criticism, it will not damage any security or intelligence interest . . . .”  Id. 
at [66] (quoting R. v. Shayler, [2003] A.C. 247 (H.L.) 272 (Lord Bingham of 
Cornhill) (appeal taken from EWCA (Crim)) (U.K.)). 
 60. Id. at [62]–[63], [76]–[79] (noting that the Foreign Secretary perceived 
the U.S. threat to be real, and that if the threat were carried out, U.K. national 
security interests would be seriously prejudiced); see Ministers Face Torture Pressure, 
BBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2009, 20:53 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news 
/politics/7870049.stm (noting that Foreign Secretary David Miliband denied that 
the United States made a threat; Miliband instead stated that the U.S.-U.K. security 
relationship was based on trust and that trust depended on intelligence remaining 
confidential). 
 61. Mohamed, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [102], [104]–[105] (Eng.). 
 62. Id. at [79]. 
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based on its conclusion that it would have been a grave injustice to 
let the matter die because of U.S. executive branch pressures.  The 
court reopened its ruling on public interest immunity and, in 
October 2009, reversed its previous decision to withhold the 
information regarding Mohamed’s treatment by the U.S. 
government.63  The court reasoned that there was an extremely low 
likelihood that the Obama Administration would actually withhold 
important intelligence from the U.K. government under these 
circumstances64 and noted that “a vital public interest requires, for 
reasons of democratic accountability and the rule of law in the 
United Kingdom, that a summary of the most important evidence 
relating to the involvement of the British security services in 
wrongdoing be placed in the public domain in the United 
Kingdom.”65 
The October 2009 decision in the Mohamed case reflects both 
the strength of English precedent that mandates a high level of 
deference to the government in matters related to public interest 
immunity and the hard questions that courts must face in applying 
that deferential standard when doing so implicates the rule of law, 
individual rights, and government accountability in matters of 
serious allegations of human rights abuses.66  The opinion 
ultimately rejected formalistic reasoning about the process in place 
that would necessarily lead to deference to the executive in favor of 
maintaining the rule of law, “open justice,” and the possibility of 
public accountability for whatever role the U.K. government had in 
maltreating Mohamed.67 
In February 2010, the English Court of Appeal considered the 
Foreign Secretary’s argument that government information that 
involved intelligence from the United States ought not to be 
 
 63. Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2009] 
EWHC (Admin) 2653, [7] (Eng.) (noting that reopening of a case should be done 
in “exceptional circumstances” if necessary in the “interests of justice”). 
 64. Id. at [39], [49], [69vi], [104].  The court noted that the objections made 
by the Obama Administration to disclosing the information in question were not 
as strong as the threats made by the Bush Administration.  Id. 
 65. Id. at [105]. 
 66. See KENT ROACH, THE 9/11 EFFECT: COMPARATIVE COUNTER-TERRORISM 
223–24 (2011) (addressing the different attitudes of U.S. and U.K. courts in the 
Mohamed litigation). 
 67. See Steven D. Schwinn, State Secrets, Open Justice, and the Criss-Crossing 
Evolution of Privilege in the United States and the United Kingdom, 29 L’OBSERVATEUR 
DES NATIONS UNIES 171, 186 (2011) (discussing open justice principles). 
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disclosed.68  It upheld the Divisional Court’s decision, reiterating 
open justice principles that provide for both procedural and 
substantive justice.  Bolstering the reasoning of the lower court with 
regard to these principles, the Court of Appeal took notice not just 
of the formal process of how to consider public interest immunity, 
but also the veracity of Mohamed’s claims and the need for the 
court to hold in a way that maintained fairness in the 
proceedings.69 
Specifically, the appellate decision looked to dicta in the U.S. 
habeas corpus matter of Mohammed v. Obama.70  In that case, Judge 
Kessler of the D.C. District Court weighed the petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus from detainee Farhi Saeed bin Mohammed and 
considered evidence proffered by the government that Binyam 
Mohamed, while in detention at Guantanamo Bay, told the 
government that bin Mohammed had trained with him at an al 
Qaeda base.71  Judge Kessler described at length and in much detail 
the harrowing detention and torture of Binyam Mohamed while in 
United States custody; based on the duration and severity of his 
mistreatment, she held that his testimony with regard to bin 
Mohammed was unreliable and, therefore, inadmissible.72  She 
further noted that “[t]he Government does not challenge or deny 
the accuracy of Binyam Mohamed’s story of brutal treatment.”73 
The English Court of Appeal took close notice of the 
acceptance by Judge Kessler of the veracity of Binyam Mohamed’s 
claims regarding his treatment and used this revelation as one of 
the bases for reaffirming its open justice principles and upholding 
the order for the U.K. government to disclose information 
regarding Mohamed’s mistreatment.74  This willingness of the 
 
 68. Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2010] 
EWCA (Civ) 158, [2011] Q.B. 218 (Eng.). 
 69. See Adam Tomkins, National Security and the Due Process of Law, 64 CURRENT 
LEGAL PROBLEMS 215, 229 (2011) (noting that the fact that Mohamed’s case 
involved allegations of horrific torture weighed significantly in the court’s 
decision-making regarding the public interest immunity question). 
 70. 704 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009).  This citation refers to the declassified 
opinion that was made publicly available on December 16, 2009.  The original 
version of the opinion, dated November 19, 2009, is cited at Mohammed v. Obama, 
689 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 71. Mohammed, 704 F. Supp 2d. at 2, 18–19. 
 72. Id. at 20–23, 29. 
 73. Id. at 24. 
 74. Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
[2010] EWCA (Civ) 65 [138], [2011] Q.B. 218 (Eng.). 
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English Court of Appeal to take notice of a U.S. federal court 
decision in which relevant facts were discussed and engage in a 
realist analysis serves as a sharp contrast to the Ninth Circuit en 
banc decision in Mohamed, where the majority does not appear to 
concern itself with evidence of the veracity of Mohamed’s claims, 
does not take note of Judge Kessler’s opinion—even though it had 
been brought to the court’s attention—and instead limits itself to 
an overly formalistic interpretation of the state secrets privilege that 
fails to address human rights concerns in a meaningful way.75 
B. Israel 
Israeli courts, like their English counterparts, offer an example 
of how the courts balance imperatives of security with the rule of 
law when they refuse to accept a narrow interpretation of their own 
role.  In Israel, the analysis of a state secrets-type claim turns on two 
questions: whether the case is justiciable, and, if so, how to evaluate 
potentially sensitive evidence that relates to national security 
matters.76  Analysis of both of these questions is undertaken using a 
flexible, realist approach to decision-making that accounts for the 
government’s interest and, more importantly, gives significant 
weight to plaintiffs’ allegations that human rights have been 
violated.  This type of approach and the mindset of the Israeli 
courts reflect similar attitudes to the English reasoning in the 
Mohamed case. 
In Israel, almost any complaint against the executive branch is 
considered justiciable.77  The Israeli Supreme Court “dismantled 
various doctrinal barriers to judicial review in the 1990s, such as 
 
 75. In fact, the only reference to Judge Kessler’s decision comes in a footnote 
referencing the Mohammed case, in which the court notes that Binyam Mohamed’s 
allegations have been discussed elsewhere.  See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, 
Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1074 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 76. Israel’s Evidence Act includes provisions on how courts should consider 
government assertions of a privilege surrounding sensitive information that, in 
many respects, mirror the structure used in England and the United States.  See 
Evidence Ordinance (New Version), 5731-1971, 2 LSI 198, §§ 44–46 (1968–1972) 
(Isr.).  However, the Israeli Supreme Court’s analysis with regard to the invocation 
of the privilege as a matter of justiciability depends on constitutional and common 
law sources that are separate from the Evidence Act. 
 77. Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a 
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 153 (2002) (“Our Supreme Court—which in 
Israel serves as the court of first instance for complaints against the executive 
branch—opens its doors to anyone with a complaint about the activities of a public 
authority.”). 
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standing and justiciability,” in order to facilitate more private 
actions.78  Even with an extremely broad grant of standing—
particularly by U.S. standards—Israeli courts undertake a balancing 
analysis to determine whether national-security-related litigation 
ought to continue or be dismissed as non-justiciable.  Although 
justiciability is no guarantee of ultimate success in litigation against 
the government, this layer of procedural protection reflects a 
willingness of the courts to step away from formulaic and 
formalistic decision-making and is particularly remarkable given 
the national security climate and political pressures in Israel.79 
One illustrative case is Public Committee Against Torture in Israel 
v. Israel,80 in which the central issue was whether preventative strikes 
undertaken by the Israeli military in response to alleged terrorist 
attacks were illegal.  The plaintiffs challenged the practices of the 
military based on the loss of civilian life in the strikes and Israel’s 
obligations under international treaties and international 
customary law.  However, before reaching a conclusion as to the 
merits of the case, the court considered a challenge by the 
government that the suit was not justiciable based on national 
security concerns.81 
The Israeli Supreme Court considered the broad Israeli 
justiciability doctrine82 and applied a four-pronged test to 
 
 78. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Checks and Balances in Wartime: American, British and 
Israeli Experiences, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1906, 1923 (2004).  Schulhofer also notes that 
Israeli government and military leaders seem to accept the judicial safeguards that 
have been put into place to modify the conduct of the administration.  Id. at 1931. 
 79. See, e.g., HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel 5 ¶ 10, 
9–10 ¶ 16, 33 ¶ 47 [2005] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng 
/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf (“Between Israel and the various terrorist 
organizations . . . a continuous situation of armed conflict has existed since the 
first intifada.”); HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel 4 ¶ 1 
[1999] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/94/000/051/a09 
/94051000.a09.pdf (“The State of Israel has been engaged in an unceasing 
struggle for both its security—indeed, its very existence.”); Schulhofer, supra note 
78, at 1918–19 (describing the security risks faced by Israel since its founding). 
 80. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel [2005] (Isr.), 
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34 
.pdf. 
 81. Id. at 5 ¶ 9 (arguing against justiciability, the government cites Israeli 
High Court of Justice precedent, HCJ 5872/01 Barakeh v. Prime Minister 56(3) 
[2002] (Isr.), for the proposition that “the choice of means of war employed by 
[the government] in order to prevent murderous terrorist attacks before they 
happen, is not among the subjects in which this Court will see fit to intervene”). 
 82. The Court considered two strands of Israeli justiciability doctrine—
normative and institutional.  For a fuller discussion, see Setty, supra note 6, at 246. 
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determine whether this was an issue in which the court should 
involve itself.  The Israeli Supreme Court reasoned that a case 
involving the impingement of human rights is always justiciable;83 
that a case in which the central issue is one of political or military 
policy and not a legal dispute is not justiciable;84 that an issue that 
has already been decided by international courts and tribunals to 
which Israel is a signatory must be justiciable in Israel’s domestic 
courts; and that judicial review is most appropriate in an ex post 
situation.85  
When the first and second prongs of the justiciability analysis 
come into conflict in a particular situation, courts undertake a 
proportionality analysis, which, by its very nature, involves the court 
stepping away from a rigid approach and adopting a flexible view 
to determine whether a suit should continue.86  Applying these 
criteria to the situation at hand, the Israeli Supreme Court found 
that the claims were clearly justiciable and that the plaintiffs’ suit 
could go forward.87  Ultimately, the Israeli Supreme Court 
concluded that the targeted killings at issue in the case were not 
per se illegal, but that they must be evaluated on an individual 
basis—again reflecting the court’s priority in retaining a flexible 
analysis in evaluating the best course of action when balancing the 
imperatives of security, transparency, accountability, and the rule of 
law.88 
Israeli courts have consistently been involved in weighing 
national security interests against human rights concerns and have 
 
 83. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel 34–35 ¶ 50 
[2005] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34 
/02007690.a34.pdf (citing HCJ 606/78 Oyeb v. Minister of Def. 33(2) IsrSC 113, 
124 [1978] (Isr.)). 
 84. Id. at 35 ¶ 51 (citing HCJ 4481/91 Bargil v. Israel 37(4) IsrSC 210, 218 
[1993] (Isr.)). 
 85. Id. at 36 ¶¶ 53–54. 
 86. Id. at 38 ¶ 58. 
Between these two ends of the spectrum, there are intermediate 
situations.  Each of them requires a meticulous examination of the 
character of the decision.  To the extent that it has a legal aspect, it 
approaches the one end of the spectrum.  To the extent that it has a 
professional military aspect, it approaches the other end of the spectrum. 
Id. 
 87. Id. at 1–2 ¶¶ 1–3.  
 88. Id. at 41–42 ¶ 63.  This decision is particularly notable given the recent 
U.S. decision dismissing a suit challenging the U.S. targeted killing program.  See 
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing, based on 
standing grounds, the suit of Nasser al-Aulaqi to enjoin the U.S. government from 
keeping his son, U.S. citizen Anwar al-Aulaqi, on its targeted killing list). 
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developed a sophisticated analysis to do so.  Like their English 
counterparts, they appear to view the rule of law as demanding that 
the courts assert themselves in security matters despite hesitations 
based on security imperatives or historical deference.  Justice 
Procaccia, in Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. 
Minister of the Interior, explained the rule of law approach that 
underpins the thinking of Israeli courts: 
The “security need” argument made by the state has no 
magical power such that once raised it must be accepted 
without inquiry and investigation . . . . Admittedly, as a 
rule, the court is cautious in examining the security 
considerations of the authorities and it does not intervene 
in them lightly.  Notwithstanding, where the 
implementation of a security policy involves a violation of 
human rights, the court should examine the 
reasonableness of the considerations of the authorities 
and the proportionality of the measures that they wish to 
implement.89 
C.   India 
If England and Israel illustrate the ability of courts to utilize a 
rule of law analysis regarding secret information and justiciability, 
India represents a hard line of formalism that the United States is 
at risk of veering toward. 
Historically, Indian courts have granted the utmost deference 
to the executive branch as to when national security policy should 
be disclosed.90  When cases raise issues of individual rights being 
compromised by government secrecy, courts undertake a balancing 
test to determine whether the public interest or individual rights at 
stake should override executive secrecy; however, government 
claims regarding the necessity of secrecy, as in the U.S. state secrets 
privilege cases in the post-9/11 context, consistently prevail.91 
 
 89. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr. for Arab Minority Rights in Isr. v. Minister 
of Interior 260 ¶ 10 [2006] (Isr.) (citing Ajuri v. IDF Commander in the W. Bank 
[1], 375–76; HCJ 9070/00 Livnat v. Chairman of Constitution, Law & Justice 
Comm. 810), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/03/520/070/a47 
/03070520.a47.pdf. 
 90. E.g., State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 865 (India) 
(carving out national security as the area in which the Prime Minister can 
unilaterally decide what information to disclose); see Satish & Chandra, supra note 
10, at 65 (describing the history of Indian courts deferring to executive decisions 
regarding security matters). 
 91. E.g., People’s Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., 
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Deference to executive branch decision-making is deeply 
rooted in national-security-related cases92 and is consistent with 
India’s history of granting the executive branch sole power to 
determine whether to disclose information in any number of 
contexts, including enforcement of its Official Secrets Act, a legacy 
of British colonial rule in India.93  Courts consistently discuss the 
need for government accountability and transparency, but 
ultimately revert to a formalist analysis that defers to an executive 
branch claim for nondisclosure in the name of public interest.   
The case of Dinesh Trivedi v. Union of India94 exemplifies the 
type of reasoning that the Indian Supreme Court often relies upon 
to uphold government secrecy claims.  In Trivedi, the Indian 
Supreme Court considered whether to order the publication of 
background documents underlying a commissioned report on 
government corruption, which the government had withheld based 
on a claim of needed secrecy.  Members of Parliament, including 
 
(2004) 2 S.C.C. 476 (India) (upholding denial of request for disclosure of 
information). 
 92. This deference has been consistent, despite the adoption of right-to-
information legislation in recent years and judicial statements about the 
importance of government transparency.  Freedom of Information Act, No. 5 of 
2003, INDIA CODE (2009), available at http://indiacode.nic.in; e.g., S.P. Gupta v. 
President of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 234, ¶ 66 (India) (“The concept of an open 
government is the direct emanation from the right to know which seems to be 
implicit in the right of free speech and expression guaranteed under Article 
19(1)(a) [of the Indian Constitution].  Therefore, disclosure of information in 
regard to the functioning of Government must be the rule and secrecy an 
exception justified only where the strictest requirement of public interest so 
demands.”); see also Country Passing Through Transparency Revolution: Antony, UNITED 
NEWS OF INDIA, June 8, 2011 (quoting Defense Minister A.K. Antony as hailing the 
advent of a “transparency revolution” in which the “walls of secrecy were 
crumbling”). 
 93. India operates under the edicts of the Official Secrets Act, No. 19 of 1923, 
INDIA CODE (2009), available at http://indiacode.nic.in, enforced in India by the 
British colonial government.  Under the Official Secrets Act (OSA), any disclosure 
of information—intentional or inadvertent—likely to affect the sovereignty, 
integrity, or security of India is punishable by imprisonment for up to fourteen 
years.  Although similar provisions of the Official Secrets Act were removed in 
England in 1989, the provisions of the 1923 Act remain in effect in India, despite 
criticism of its application.  See Sarbari Sinha, Official Secrets and a Frame-Up, 
FRONTLINE, May 7, 2005, available at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2210 
/stories/20050520000607400.htm (addressing how revocation of the Official 
Secrets Act would curb potential abuses of police powers). 
 94. Dinesh Trivedi v. Union of India, (1997) 4 S.C.C. 306 (India).  The Court 
in Trivedi relies heavily on the balancing test articulated in S.P. Gupta, A.I.R. 1982 
S.C. 234, to find that government secrecy claims ought to be upheld despite rule 
of law concerns. 
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petitioner Dinesh Trivedi, alleged that the Home Minister refused 
disclosure to avoid government embarrassment.95  In response, the 
Home Secretary submitted an affidavit affirming the accuracy of a 
publicly distributed summary report, but claiming that additional 
documents could not be disclosed as a matter of public interest.96 
The Indian Supreme Court’s response is emblematic of the 
reflexively deferential and overly formalistic reasoning in matters of 
national security and government secrecy.  The Indian Supreme 
Court begins with familiar language about the necessity of 
transparency to curb government abuse and uphold the rule of law, 
noting that, “Sunlight is the best disinfectant.  But it is equally 
important to be alive to the dangers that lie ahead.”97  The Indian 
Supreme Court accepts with little question the government’s 
assertion that publication of the report may be injurious to the 
public interest and goes further to hypothesize that the public 
furor toward individuals named in the report—should it be 
published in full—could lead to harassment and violence.  Based 
on its own speculative concerns that appear grounded in historical 
deference to executive decision-making, the court held that 
publication of the full report and its underlying documents was 
unwarranted.98 
This pattern of acknowledging the policy and rights concerns 
underlying a case, but ultimately siding with the government’s 
position with little investigation into the veracity of the 
government’s claims, has played out in other secrecy-related cases.99  
In doing so, the Indian Supreme Court has opined that its 
deference to government secrecy claims is bolstered by its 
consistency with English cases on public interest immunity.100  In 
 
 95. Trivedi, 4 S.C.C. 306, ¶¶ 6, 8. 
 96. Id. ¶¶ 9–10. 
 97. Id. ¶ 19. 
 98. Id. ¶¶ 16–20. 
 99. E.g., People’s Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., 
(2004) 2 S.C.C. 476 (India).  The Court in this case upheld the government’s 
secrecy claim over a report on nuclear reactors, reasoning that that secrecy was 
sometimes necessary because “[i]f every action taken by the political or executive 
functionary is transformed into a public controversy and made subject to an 
enquiry to soothe popular sentiments, it will undoubtedly have a chilling effect on 
the independence of the decision-maker.”  See id. (the Right of Information 
section).  
 100. See id. (the Criteria for Determining the Question of Privilege section, 
holding that “the foundation of the law behind Sections 123 and 162 of the 
Evidence Act is the same as in English law.  It is that injury to public interest is the 
reason for the exclusion from disclosure of documents whose contents if disclosed 
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one case, this deference manifested itself in the Indian Supreme 
Court declining review of documents over which the government 
claimed secrecy even after the government had proffered 
submission for in camera review.101  The level of deference offered 
by the Indian Supreme Court is higher than that of any of the 
other nations surveyed here, but is arguably more consistent with 
the recent state secrets cases in the United States than that of the 
English courts in the Mohamed litigation.102 
The failure of the Indian Supreme Court to engage in a more 
meaningful analysis of rights claims in the secrecy and security 
contexts is unsurprising.  In crafting counterterrorism legislation, 
Parliament has responded to public pressure and arguable 
constitutional priorities103 in prioritizing robust security measures 
over protection of individual rights.104  The Indian Supreme Court, 
consistent with its security-related jurisprudence, has little appetite 
for putting itself in a countermajoritarian role and instead has 
consistently reverted to a formalistic analysis that offers a rhetorical 
nod to the rule of law and individual rights, but no substantive 
relief to those who seek to chip away at government secrecy.105 
V. CONCLUSION 
Current trends in U.S. state secrets jurisprudence offer two 
related insights.  First, U.S. courts in the post-9/11 context are 
 
would injure public and national interest”) (citing Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, 
A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 865 (India)). 
 101. See id. (the Conclusion section).  
 102. There is no indication that the adoption of a right to information statute 
in 2005 has substantially affected the reasoning of the courts with regard to 
security-related secrecy, particularly since the statute contains a carve-out for 
national security matters.  See The Right to Information Act, No. 22 of 2005, INDIA 
CODE (2009), available at http://indiacode.nic.in. 
 103. See SHYLASHRI SHANKAR, SCALING JUSTICE: INDIA’S SUPREME COURT, ANTI-
TERROR LAWS, AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 61–71, 90–91 (2009) (arguing that whereas social 
rights is considered an area in which the judiciary is expected to take an active 
role, security and secrecy are areas in which the constitutional framers and 
Parliament have purposefully curtailed the judiciary’s ability to curb executive 
power). 
 104. See Sudha Setty, What’s in a Name: How Nations Define Terrorism Ten Years 
After 9/11, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 46–54 (2011) (detailing the history of Indian 
counterterrorism legislation and the court’s validation of legislation that has been 
abused to violate civil rights and liberties). 
 105. See Satish & Chandra, supra note 10, at 73 (critiquing the Indian Supreme 
Court’s terrorism jurisprudence for focusing on procedural and technical 
questions and abdicating its role as a protector of fundamental rights). 
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shifting toward a formalized approach to the privilege that is, in 
some respects, reminiscent of Indian jurisprudence—formal 
acknowledgement of rule of law imperatives, but ultimately 
deciding that the judiciary’s role is not to stake a position contrary 
to the executive branch, resulting in a consistent lack of relief for 
individual litigants.  In India, this dynamic has been reflected in 
national-security-related cases for some time; the context of 
challenging secrecy designations may be relatively new, but the 
reasoning of the courts and the ultimate result is the same.  In the 
United States, the state secrets cases illustrate what may be 
becoming the new normal in security-related jurisprudence: 
formalistic reasoning that allows the court to bow out of its 
countermajoritarian role of protecting individual rights and justice.  
Certainly the approach taken by India and the United States is not 
the only viable one—England and Israel are evidence of that. 
Second, the Mohamed case illustrates that England’s current 
application of the state secrets privilege—however historically 
deferential—reflects at least in some cases the prioritization of 
various rule of law principles by the English courts, including the 
need for open justice, government accountability, and the 
opportunity for redress by individual litigants.  The flexible 
approach used by the English court to determine that secrecy 
ought not prevail in the Mohamed case is reassuring to those 
concerned with rights protection.  Yet the larger specter of the 
United States exerting pressure regarding the state secrets privilege 
serves as a warning that even though the United States was not 
successful with regard to applying pressure on England,106 given 
U.S. soft power around the world, it may be successful in other 
 
 106. The U.S. government’s displeasure with the English treatment of Binyam 
Mohamed’s case has, however, motivated the British government to propose the 
stripping of judicial review over similar cases in which sensitive information may be 
disclosed.  See SECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICE, JUSTICE AND SECURITY GREEN PAPER, 
2011, Cm. 8194, ¶ 2.91 (U.K.), available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011 
/oct/uk-justice-and-security-green-paper.pdf.  The Green Paper notes that such 
measures are necessary because “[s]ince Binyam Mohamed, the Government and its 
foreign government partners have less confidence than before that the courts will 
accept the view of Ministers on the harm to national security that would result 
from disclosure.”  Id. at ¶ 1.43; cf. ADAM TOMKINS & TOM HICKMAN, BINGHAM 
CENTRE FOR THE RULE OF LAW, RESPONSE TO THE JUSTICE AND SECURITY GREEN PAPER 
¶¶ 66–70 (Jan. 6, 2012), available at www.biicl.org/files/5829_bingham_centre 
_response_to_green_paper.pdf (arguing that the Green Paper’s proposal to strip 
judicial review of such cases is based on misconceptions, is unjustified, and would 
undermine the rule of law). 
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nations where courts would otherwise apply a narrower privilege. 
As it stands, there is no incentive for any administration—
Democratic or Republican—to curtail its own power with regard to 
the state secrets privilege.  The 2009 Holder Memorandum adds 
layers of intra-executive oversight that have yielded little in terms of 
increasing government transparency or furthering rule of law 
principles.107  That leaves Congress and the courts to act.  
Congressional apathy on this issue has been clear; although useful 
and thoughtful legislation108 on this issue has been proposed twice, 
it has not been passed, and there is no apparent political 
motivation or will for Congress to take up state secrets reform now. 
When Mohamed filed his U.S. suit seeking redress for human 
rights violations allegedly suffered from rendition and torture, it 
was understood that the executive branch would invoke the state 
secrets privilege and that Congress had not offered guidance on 
applying the privilege.  Instead of acknowledging this reality and 
embracing the unique ability and obligation of the courts to 
balance security interests with the grave human rights concerns at 
issue, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc employed formalistic, 
deferential, and altogether unsatisfactory reasoning to suggest that 
the judiciary must defer to the executive.  The abdication of the 
judiciary’s responsibility in the name of executive branch secrecy 
concerns is all the more striking when contrasted with the 
reasoning of courts in England and Israel.  Modern state secrets 
jurisprudence in these two nations ought to counsel the courts 
toward a rule-of-law-oriented approach to future litigation in this 
area. 
Passage of strong state secrets reform legislation should 
remain a priority to ensure an external, long-term check on 
executive branch overreaching.109  In the meantime, courts should 
 
 107. See Christina E. Wells, State Secrets and Executive Accountability, 26 CONST. 
COMMENT. 625, 643–46 (2010) (discussing the limits of intra-executive review of 
secrecy decisions).  Wells further observes that if “nothing in the Obama [state 
secrets] policy or subsequent actions suggests that the Administration will hold 
itself accountable, courts’ inconsistency in applying the [state secrets] privilege 
presents further problems.”  Id. at 648. 
 108. See Setty, supra note 6, at 255–59 (discussing potential benefits of the 
proposed state secrets reforms and suggesting additional reform measures). 
 109. Legislative inertia and a high level of deference to executive branch 
decision-making have hobbled many avenues for genuine legislative oversight or 
any kind of substantial reform efforts with regard to national security and the rule 
of law.  See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 
1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 455, 464–66 (2005) (discussing inaccuracies in the 
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heed the lessons of nations like England and Israel in not being 
cowed by assertions that judicial involvement in security matters is 
unwarranted or undermines the safety of the nation.110  Instead, 
courts must take on the responsibility of offering a realistic 
opportunity for redress for those alleging grave violations of civil 
rights and civil liberties, even—and perhaps especially—during 
times of war. 
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